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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) and
(5) and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue: Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal
property may be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3). Order Granting
Certiorari (Nov. 3, 2005).
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, [this Court] review[s] the court of appeals'
decision for correctness, focusing on whether that court correctly reviewed the trial
court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005 UT 29,
Tf 8, 116 P.3d 290 (internal quotation omitted). This appeal presents a question of
statutory construction, which is reviewed for correctness. See John Holmes Constr. v.
R.A. McKell Excavating, 2005 UT 83,1j 6, _ P.3d _ .
Preservation: Wasatch failed to preserve before the trial court the issue of whether
treble damages may be awarded for harm caused to personal property. See Point II,
below. As a result, while the court of appeals was entitled to affirm the award of treble
damages on the merits, as it did, it was also entitled to affirm for lack of preservation.
This Court may likewise affirm on preservation grounds. See American Fork City v.
Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, ^ 7, 63 P.3d 675 (holding that this Court "'may affirm the
court of appeals' decision on any ground supported in the record.'") (quoting Collins v.
Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment 2002 UT 77, If 11, 52 P.3d 1267); see also, e.g.. State v.
Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, ^ 3, 123 P.3d 407 (affirming judgment on "alternate grounds" to
1

those expressed by court of appeals); Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., L.L.C., 2005 UT 59, *[[
6, 123 P.3d 393 (same).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 (2002), and other relevant
portions of Chapter 36 of Title 78. The entire statute is attached for the Court's reference
as Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
Aris commenced this action against its landlord, JDJ Properties, and JDJ's

property manager and agent, Wasatch Property Management, (collectively "Wasatch"),
claiming that Wasatch had wrongfully evicted Aris from its laser eye surgery center when
Wasatch forcefully prevented Aris from entering its premises, changed the locks to the
premises, and thereby held hostage Aris's lasers and other surgical equipment for five
months. In addition to damages for common-law conversion and wrongful eviction, Aris
sought damages under the forcible detainer statute for the depreciation, loss, and damage
of its personal property that Wasatch had locked within the premises.
After a three-day bench trial, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision
[R.369-75],1 along with Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [R.480-504], holding
Wasatch liable for wrongful eviction, forcible detainer, and conversion, and concluding
1

References to the trial court record appear as [R._J. Relevant pages from the four
volumes of trial transcripts, which are marked as part of the record as R. 526, 527, 528,
and 529, are cited by the page of the record and the page of the transcript, e.g., [R.527 at
56].
2

that Wasatch's wrongful acts proximately caused the depreciation, loss, and damage of
Aris's personal property [R.500]. The trial court entered Judgment for damages, and
trebled these damages under the forcible detainer statute. [R.500.]
Wasatch appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed in all respects. This Court
granted a writ of certiorari on the limited issue of "[w]hether damages awarded for loss,
damage, and depreciation to personal property may be trebled pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-36-10(3)." Order Granting Certiorari (Nov. 3, 2005).
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Aris owned and operated a laser eye surgery center located in a suite within the

Woodlands Business Park in Murray, Utah (the "Premises"), which Aris leased from
Wasatch pursuant to a written lease agreement (the "Lease"). Aris employed David
Skalka as center manager and contracted with four physicians (the "Doctors") who
performed surgeries on the Premises using Aris's three lasers and other equipment.
[Findings of Factffif1-5, 7-9, 84.]2
Skalka and the Doctors had been Wasatch's tenants long before Aris opened its
center, and Wasatch principals were the Doctors' patients. In mid-2001, Wasatch began
negotiating with Skalka and the Doctors to set up a competing center in vacant space in
the same building at a more advantageous rent. Unbeknownst to Aris, this culminated in
a January 1, 2002, lease for Skalka and the Doctors elsewhere in the same building.
Skalka and the Doctors later negotiated with Wasatch to build out a new, larger surgery
For the Court's convenience, the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law [R.480-504], which are cited extensively herein, are attached as Addendum A.
The Judgment [R.505-07] is attached as Addendum B.
3

center in an expensive, premium suite in an adjacent building. [Findings of Factfflf10,
19,41-42,93.]
After an industry downturn, Aris determined to close its doors. On January 4,
2002, Aris terminated Skalka, but permitted Skalka and the Doctors to remain in the
Premises performing surgeries while Aris negotiated to sell them Aris's surgical laser
equipment and have them assume the Lease. Sometime after the 4th of January,
Wasatch's building manager, Dennis Peacock, confronted Skalka because Aris had
missed its January rent payment. Skalka told him about his termination and Aris's
financial trouble, and Peacock responded that Aris's equipment and furniture could not
be removed under any circumstances. [Findings of Factfflf11-19.]
Aris's negotiations with Skalka and the Doctors proved unsuccessful, and Aris
arranged to sell its personal property to pay escalating debts. Aris sent Richard Enright, a
manager, to remove and store Aris's laser equipment and other property pending its sale.
On January 22,2002, Enright proceeded to the Premises, met Skalka, and stated that he
had come to enter the Premises and remove Aris's property. Enright was able to
inventory Aris's property, but Skalka told him that the landlord had seized all of it.
[Findings of Factfflf20-24.]
Skalka referred Enright to Peacock, who confirmed that Wasatch had seized Aris's
property. Enright tendered a rent check, but Peacock refused it and refused to release
Aris's property. When Enright insisted on entering the Premises and removing Aris's
property, Peacock directed him to leave the Premises immediately and threatened to have

4

the police forcefully remove Enright if he ever returned. Pursuant to Peacock's demand,
Enright promptly left without removing Aris's property. [Findings of Factfflf24-33, 35.]
The next day, Aris brought this action and commenced settlement negotiations
with Wasatch's counsel, who quickly proposed that Aris and Wasatch pursue an asset
sale and lease assignment to Skalka and the Doctors. He did not disclose to Aris that
Skalka and the Doctors had already obtained a lease for a new, competing center. Not
surprisingly, Skalka and the Doctors eventually declined to take over Aris's Lease and to
purchase its equipment. They instead relocated directly to their new space under a new
lease with Wasatch. Then, on two separate occasions, Peacock changed the locks to the
Premises, but never told Aris and never provided a key. [Findings of Factfflj37-42, 4 5 47, 70.]
When negotiations with Wasatch failed, Aris proceeded with a motion for writ of
replevin seeking the return of its equipment. However, when Wasatch's counsel
expressed opposition and insisted on a sizeable bond that Aris could not afford, Aris
postponed the replevin hearing and continued to work with Wasatch to locate a new
tenant. [Findings of Factffif48-56.]
During the ensuing few months, Aris was provided limited access to the Premises,
supervised throughout by Peacock, who kept the keys, unlocked the Premises, and stood
guard to ensure that Aris removed nothing from the Premises. During these supervised
visits, Enright inventoried Aris's property and discovered that various pieces of
equipment and inventory worth $16,118.82 had been removed since his inventory of

5

January 22, 2002. Enright also discovered that two of Aris's lasers had been damaged
while in Wasatch's custody. [Findings of Fact Iflf 57-62, 80-81.]
Aris attempted on one occasion to sell a few pieces of its equipment while it was
in Wasatch's custody, but Wasatch would only permit it if Aris paid all the proceeds to
Wasatch. Because of Wasatch's refusal the sale fell through. After this episode, Aris
determined to proceed with the litigation. On or about June 25,2002, Wasatch finally
relented and directed Peacock to let Aris remove its personal property—a change from its
previous instructions to Peacock. [Findings of Fact f^f 64-68, 70, 73-76.]
Unfortunately, by that time, Aris's equipment had depreciated dramatically. Laser
surgery equipment depreciates extremely rapidly and becomes obsolete because new
models are released every 12 to 18 months. Aris could have obtained $200,000 per laser
in January 2002, but only $55,000 to $60,000 in July 2002. Aris paid off loans on the
lasers, sold one to VISX for a loss, and sold the two damaged lasers to VISX for a credit
against Aris's debt. Based on the damage that the two lasers had sustained, VISX
deducted $53,000 from the credit Aris received. [Findings of Factfflf77-78, 82-83.]
This case proceeded to a bench trial. Aris presented fact testimony detailing the
loss and damage to Aris's property. Aris also offered unrebutted expert testimony that
Aris's equipment and other property depreciated by $118,568.81 while in Wasatch's
custody. [Findings of Fact Tf 79; R.l 12-51; PL Ex. 51.]
The trial court issued a memorandum decision, findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and judgment. [R.369-75, 480-504, 432-34.] The trial court found that Wasatch
improperly seized Aris's property without judicial process, using it as a "bargaining chip"
6

to force Aris to pay future rents. With Aris in financial trouble, the trial court found,
Wasatch believed that seizing Aris's personal property would ensure payment.
Moreover, the trial court found, by providing to Skalka and the Doctors a substantially
more favorable lease, Wasatch made it unlikely that Skalka and the Doctors would ever
assume Aris's lease. [Findings of Factfflj43-44, 88-89.]
Based on detailed findings, the trial court entered judgment against Wasatch on
Aris's wrongful eviction, forcible detainer, and conversion claims. [R.505-07.] The trial
court awarded $118,568.81 for the depreciation of Aris's property, $16,118.82 for the
value of Aris's missing property, and $53,000 for the damage to Aris's lasers, and trebled
damages under the forcible detainer statute. [Conclusions of Lawfflf14-15.] The trial
court also awarded Aris's security deposit of $13,393.89 (less unpaid January rent of
$9556.38), along with costs and attorney fees. [Conclusions of Law Tffl 17-18; R.50507.]
Wasatch appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in all respects. See Aris Vision
Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Mgmt, Inc., 2005 UT App 326, 121 P.3d 24. Wasatch
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which this Court issued on the following limited issue:
"Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal property may
be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3)." Order Granting Certiorari (Nov.
3, 2005).

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' decision to uphold the trebling of
the damages caused by Wasatch's forcible detainer. Utah's forcible detainer statute and
the Utah cases construing it permit the trial court to award any and all damages caused by
the forcible detainer. Wasatch completely ignores the statute itself, and fails even to
cite—much less distinguish—a single Utah forcible detainer case. Based on the statute
and case law, the ruling of the court of appeals was correct and must be upheld. As an
alternate basis, this Court can affirm since the issue of whether treble damages can be
awarded for damage to personal property by a landlord's forcible detainer was not
preserved before the trial court and should not have been considered for the first time on
appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURT'S TREBLING OF THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY WASATCH'S
FORCIBLE DETAINER.
The court of appeals' ruling, like the trial court's, was correct. By finding that

Wasatch committed a forcible detainer—a ruling that is not in question on this appeal—
the trial court was obligated under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2) to award those
damages caused by the forcible detainer. Those damages consisted of the loss, damage,
and depreciation of Aris's personal property, which Wasatch locked away within the
Premises for five months before finally releasing it. Indeed, case authority shows that
such damages should be appropriately awarded to a tenant under the statue. Any

8

damages assessed for forcible detainer must be trebled. The court of appeals was correct
to affirm.
A.

Based on Wasatch's Marshaling and Preservation Failures, and This
Court's Writ of Certiorari, the Trial Court's Findings Relating to the
Forcible Detainer Are Not in Question on This Appeal.

Wasatch plays fast and loose with the trial court's findings—and this Court's own
writ of certiorari—in rearguing the evidence before the trial court. Wasatch reiterates
throughout its brief that Aris had "vacated" or "turned over possession" of the Premises,
as if to suggest that there was no forcible detainer. See Petitioners' Brief at 16, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22. On multiple grounds, these arguments are not properly before the Court and
should be rejected.
1.

Wasatch Reargues Evidence Without Addressing the Trial Court's
Findings or Marshaling Evidence Supporting Them.

Wasatch's current spin on the evidence contradicts the trial court's own findings,
and Wasatch has completely failed to marshal the evidence supporting those findings.3
The trial court expressly found that by the time the forcible detainer occurred, Aris had
not vacated the Premises, or intended or offered to surrender the Lease to Wasatch:
90.
There is no credible evidence that Aris ever vacated the
Premises prior to January 22, 2002. Likewise, there is no credible evidence
that Aris intended or offered to surrender the Lease, much less any evidence
that Wasatch or JDJ intended to accept such surrender. Since Peacock
refused to release Aris's personal property—thus preventing Aris from
selling it and reaching a settlement with Wasatch—Aris was unable to
surrender the Lease.

3

Wasatch also failed to marshal any evidence in its briefs to the court of appeals,
even conceding at oral argument before the court of appeals that it was accepting as true
the trial court's factual findings.
9

Findings of Fact at ^ 90 (Add. B, attached). Wasatch's argument that Aris vacated the
Premises before the forcible detainer occurred was rejected by the trial court below, and
Wasatch has failed to marshal the record evidence supporting the trial court's findings.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). As a result, the trial court's
findings must be taken as true, and Wasatch's argument about Aris vacating the Premises
must be rejected. See Water & Energy Svs. Tech., Inc. v. Keil 2002 UT 32,115, 48
P.3d 888 (holding that when appellant fails to meet its marshaling duty, relevant findings
are taken as true).
2.

Wasatch Failed to Preserve Below the Argument That Aris Vacated
on January 4, 2002.

Even if Wasatch had properly marshaled evidence, it failed to preserve before the
trial court the argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that Aris vacated on January
4, 2002. Wasatch argued in their brief to the trial court that "Aris did not 'vacate' until
July 2002" when it removed its property from the Premises. [R.229.] Then,
contradicting itself but without clearly enunciating a date, Wasatch argued: "In the
context of abandonment, Ms. Soto testified that she told Mr. Peacock on January 22nd
that Aris was surrendering the lease." [R.304.] Finally, Wasatch changed course again
by stating that "Aris is hard-pressed to deny it abandoned the premises once the doctors
moved out," which occurred on February 9, 2002. [R.348.] For all this waffling,
Wasatch never specifically argued below that Aris vacated on January 4, 2002—the date
Wasatch now picks as the official date on which Aris turned over possession of the
10

Premises. See Wasatch Brief at 17, 19. By failing to give the trial court an adequate
opportunity to consider this argument, Appellants waived that issue. See 438 Main Street
v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004 UT 72, If 51, 99 P.3d 801.
3.

This Court's Writ of Certiorari Limits Review to Whether Damages
to Personal Property Should Be Trebled Under Section 78-36-10(3).

Wasatch's current argument that Aris vacated the Premises is not properly before
the Court based on the narrow scope of the issue on which this Court granted certiorari:
"Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal property may
be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3)." Order Granting Certiorari (Nov.
3, 2005). In addition to this issue, Wasatch petitioned for certiorari as to the court of
appeals' rulings that (1) Aris never abandoned the Premises, (2) Wasatch committed a
forcible detainer, (3) Aris was wrongfully evicted, (3) Wasatch converted Aris's property,
and (4) Wasatch's wrongful acts caused Aris's property to depreciate. However, this
Court has declined to address any of these issues. As a result, Wasatch's present
arguments—which include assertions that Aris abandoned the Premises or transferred
possession and attack the trial court and court of appeals' rulings that a forcible detainer
occurred—are not properly before the Court and should be rejected.
In sum, the trial court held that Wasatch's actions constituted forcible detainer and
the court of appeals affirmed. The only issue now before this Court is whether the
damages awarded against Wasatch should be trebled under Section 78-36-10(3). Implicit
in that issue is whether Aris was entitled, under Section 78-36- 10(2)(b), to damages to its
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personal property resulting from Wasatch's forcible detainer of the Premises. As
addressed in detail below, the court of appeals properly affirmed on this issue.
B.

The Forcible Detainer Statute Requires the Trial Court to Award
Those Damages Caused by the Forcible Detainer,

The interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10 is at the heart of this appeal and
is central to this Court's order granting certiorari. Wasatch completely ignores the statute
in its brief, however, and fails even to quote it in argument or include it in its brief,
perhaps supposing that the statute's interpretation is not "determinative of the appeal or
of central importance to the appeal." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6). It is difficult to see,
however, how Section 78-3-10(3), is not determinative since it is identified in this
Court's order granting certiorari. Ultimately, Wasatch cannot refute the plain language of
the statute, which required the trial court, on finding that Wasatch committed a forcible
detainer, to award to Aris all damages caused by the forcible detainer and to treble those
damages. Not even a strict construction of the statute prevents this result because there is
no language whatsoever in the statute that so limits the scope of permissible damages.
Indeed, reading such a limitation into the statute would require a complete rewriting of
the statute—a task for the legislature, not this Court.
"[Wjhen interpreting a legislative enactment, [the Court's] primary role is to give
effect to the legislature's intent as set forth in the statute's plain language." State v.
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, If 9, 999 P.2d 572. The Court is not to "look beyond a statute's
plain language unless it is ambiguous." Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, f 9, 4 P.3d
783. "[W]here there is no ambiguity the plain language of the statute must be taken as
12

the expression of the Legislature's intent." P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union v.
Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988). This is because "'[t]he best evidence of the true
intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act is the plain language of the
Act.'" Id. (quoting Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
1984)); see also Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd„ 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988)
(stating that "[a] fundamental principle of statutory construction is that unambiguous
language in a statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning");
State v. Paul 860 P.2d 992, 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "courts cannot look
beyond" plain and unambiguous language "to divine legislative intent" and that "[e]ach
term in a statute should be interpreted according to its usual and commonly accepted
meaning" and that "[w]e presume that words are used in their ordinary sense").
Section 78-36-10 covers the remedies available under chapter 36 of title 78, which
deals with disputes between landlords and tenants. The treble damages provision
identified by this Court in its order granting certiorari, Section 78-36-10(3), requires that
"[t]he judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times the
amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c)." The remedies
specified under those subsections apply to claims brought by both landlords and tenants.
Section 78-36- 10(2)(a) through (c) provides:
The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff
from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer,
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(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if
waste is alleged in the complaint and proved at t r i a l . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2) (2002) (emphasis supplied).
Because Section 78-36-10(2)(a) through (c) covers damages for both landlords'
actions (for unlawful detainer and waste) and tenants' actions (for forcible entry and
forcible detainer), some confusion has arisen about the types of damages that are
awardable in these different actions. This Court now has the opportunity to resolve any
such confusion. A landlord, on the one hand, is entitled to damages for rent, unlawful
detainer, and waste under Section 78-36-10(2)(b), (c), and (d).4
A tenant, on the other hand, is entitled to damages for forcible entry and forcible
detainer under Section 78-36-10(2)(a) and (b). As between a landlord and a tenant, these
claims belong to the tenant, not the landlord, as demonstrated by the definitions of
"forcible entry" and "forcible detainer" in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-36-1, -2. In broad
language, Section 78-36-10(2)(b) requires that the trial court "shall also assess the
damages resulting to the plaintiff from .. . forcible . . . detainer." This language is clear,
plain, and unambiguous. It contains no exceptions and no limitations, but instead
mandates an assessment of "damages" caused to the tenant. Id § 78-36-10(2)(b). The
only limitation in the statute is the requirement of causation—the damages awarded must
result from the forcible detainer. See id. Any such damages must be trebled. See id. §
4

According to the definitions of unlawful detainer and waste in the statute only a
landlord can sue on such claims, not a tenant. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-3 (stating
that a "tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful detainer")
(emphasis supplied); Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2)(c) (stating that damages are to be
assessed for "waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy) (emphasis
supplied).
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78-36-10(3) (stating that the judgment "shall be entered against the defendant... for
three times the amount of the damages assessed" for forcible detainer) (emphasis
supplied).
Since there is no ambiguity in the statute, the court should interpret the term
"damages" according to its usual and commonly accepted meaning. This Court has
previously recognized that "damages" can be defined simply as "'compensation in money
imposed by law for loss or injury.'" Fuller v. Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah 1985)
(quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 323 (9th ed. 1984)). Similarly, Black's
defines "damages" as "pecuniary compensation or indemnity, which may be recovered in
the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury, whether to his
person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of
another." Black's Law Dictionary 270 (6th ed. 1991); see also Black's Law Dictionary
393 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "damages" as "money claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a
person as compensation for loss or injury"). Likewise, in Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692
P.2d 728 (Utah 1984), this Court noted the distinction between "injury" and "damage," as
follows: "'[I]njury means something done against the right of the party, producing
damage, whereas damage is the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason of the
injury.'" ML at 730 (quoting Clark v. Cassette 376 P.2d 37 (N.M. 1962)).
These definitions of "damages" encompass the damages awarded to Aris below,
which fell into three basic categories: (1) $53,000 in physical damage to Aris's personal
property, (2) $16,118.82 for lost property, and (3) $118,568.81 for depreciation to the
laser equipment. [Conclusions of Law at ^ 14.] Wasatch has completely failed to show
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how these three categories of damages are anything other than "harm, detriment, or loss
sustained by reason of the injury" caused by Wasatch—namely the forcible detainer of
Aris's leasehold premises.5 Wasatch's plea for a strict construction of the statute is to no
avail because there is no possible reading of the statute that would exclude the types of
damages awarded by the trial court in this case.
Absent any restriction on what the "damages" provided for by the statute are to
include, the trial court has wide latitude in assessing damages, whatever they might be.
And, absent any ambiguity in the statute, this Court cannot and should not craft judicial
limitations on the types of damages awardable for forcible detainer. Here, the trial court
was well within its discretion to award damages for the injury Wasatch caused to Aris's
personal property.
This view of damages is supported by the definition of "forcible detainer" in Utah
Code Ann. § 78-36-2(1), which provides that a person is guilty of a forcible detainer who
either "by force, or by menaces and threats of violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the
possession of any real property, whether the same was acquired peaceably or otherwise."
The stated policy of the legislature in allowing for treble damages for this kind of
reprehensible conduct would not be promoted by preventing a tenant from recovering
harm to personal property locked in the detained premises, particularly in this case. Here,
5

The issue of whether Wasatch's forcible detainer of the premises proximately
caused the harm to Aris's personal property is outside the scope of the writ of certiorari,
and thus not before the Court on this appeal. In any event, causation is a question of fact,
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, % 22, 990 P.2d 933; Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,
439 (Utah 1986), which the trial court already found in Aris's favor. See Conclusions of
Law at Tf 1. Wasatch did not attack the finding of causation on appeal and has not
attempted to marshal the evidence for and against the finding in its brief.
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the trial court found that Wasatch improperly seized Aris's property without judicial
process to use it as a "bargaining chip" to force Aris to pay future rents, believing that
seizing Arises personal property would ensure payment, and that Wasatch provided to
Skalka and the Doctors a substantially more favorable lease, making it unlikely that
Skalka and the Doctors would ever assume Aris's lease. [Findings of Fact *H 43-44, 8889.] Wasatch's forcible detainer thus precluded Aris from obtaining valuable and rapidly
depreciating personal property. The legislature has not imposed any limitation on the
trial court's award of these types of damages for forcible detainer, and this Court should
not judicially create any such limitations.
The trebling of these damages was mandatory. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3)
(the judgment "shall be entered against the defendant... for three times the amount of
the damages assessed under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c)" (emphasis supplied).
Forrester v.Cook, 77 Utah 137, 156, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930) (holding that the statute
"makes it mandatory upon the court to render judgment for three times the amount of
damages thus assessed"); Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 26 Utah 2d 100, 102, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036 (1971) (holding
that rules of statutory construction "require that we assume that each term of a statute was
used advisedly; and that each should be given an interpretation and application in accord
with their usually accepted meaning" and holding that the word "may" cannot be
interpreted to mean the same thing as "shall" or "must"). The court of appeals was
correct to affirm.
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C.

Utah Case Law Supports the Trial Court's Award of Damages for
Harm Wasatch Caused to Aris's Personal Property.

While forcible detainer cases in Utah are scarce relative to unlawful detainer
cases, this Court has established a clear rule governing the calculation of damages under
the forcible detainer statute, and the trial court's award of damages was proper under that
case law. The Court held in the forcible detainer case of King v. Firm, 3 Utah 2d 419,
426, 285 P.2d 1114, 1118 (1955), that if the tenant "had proved any substantial damages
which were the natural and proximate result of respondents' wrongful act [forcible entry
and detainer] he should have been granted a judgment for such damages," and that "the
only damages [plaintiff] would be entitled to would be those which would naturally result
from the wrongful taking of possession." (Overruled on other grounds in Richard Barton
Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 377 (Utah 1996).) See also Pentecost v. Harward, 699
P.2d 696, 700 (Utah 1985) (in action for conversion and wrongful eviction, holding that
"[o]ne who resorts to self-help is liable to the evicted tenant for all damages proximately
caused by the eviction") (emphasis supplied); Lambert v. Sine, 123 Utah 145, 256 P.2d
241 (1953) (awarding damages for wrongful eviction that were the "natural and
proximate consequence of the wrong").
In Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 438, 150 P.2d 100, 104 (1944), this Court
upheld an award of damages in a forcible detainer case, which appear to have been based
mainly on harassment and mental anguish. The Court found these damages to be the
direct and proximate result of the landlord's removal, during the winter, of the exterior
doors to the residence that the tenants were occupying. See 150 P.2d at 430. The Court
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reached this decision over a dissent arguing that such damages should not be awarded in
forcible detainer cases. See id. at 438-40.
This Court reached the same result in Peterson v. Piatt, 16 Utah 2d 330, 331, 400
P.2d 507, 508 (1965), in which the tenants obtained a judgment for forcible detainer after
the landlord changed the locks on the tenants' Arctic Circle restaurant. The landlord
changed the locks while the tenants were away, and when one of the tenants returned, "he
was refused permission to remove perishable goods, or the books and records," which
remained in the locked premises. Id. Notwithstanding an attempt by the parties to settle
the dispute, the Court held that the tenants "retained their right to maintain this action for
conversion of their property under our forcible entry and detainer statute" and affirmed
the judgment for damages relating to the value of personal property in the premises. 16
Utah 2d at 331-32, 400 P.2d at 508 (emphasis supplied). The facts of the instant case are
virtually identical to Peterson, and the same rule should apply. While the Court in
Peterson never addressed the trebling of damages, this may be due to the fact that
punitive damages were awarded, see id. at 331, id at 508, and trebling of course would
have been duplicative.
In addition to the instant case, the court of appeals has previously upheld an award
of treble damages for loss of and damage to personal property under the forcible detainer
statute. In Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah 1992), this issue was addressed by a
panel of the court of appeals comprised of Judge Billings, then-Judge Russon, and Judge
Orme (the author of the dissent from the court of appeals' decision in the instant case,
upon which Wasatch relies heavily in its brief). The plaintiffs in Fowler, who had rented
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a storage unit, "discovered that the lock to the storage unit had been broken and their
property removed and disposed of." Id, at 676. Plaintiffs brought suit under the forcible
detainer statute and recovered damages of $7000 for the loss of their personal property.6
See id, at 676-77. The court of appeals upheld the damages award and held that trebling
of the award was mandatory under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3). Id, at 679.
Therefore, in spite of being "baffled" by an award of treble damages for loss,
damage and depreciation of personal property in the instant case, see Aris Vision, 2005
UT App 326 at ^ 35 (Orme, J., dissenting), Judge Orme concurred in an opinion in 1992
doing that very thing. That was the correct result in Fowler, and the trial court likewise
reached the correct result in the instant case.
As in Peterson and Fowler, the trial court found that the harm to Aris's personal
property was proximately caused by the forcible detainer, and thus properly awarded
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(2). Absent any contrary Utah authority—there is
none—the trial court's award, as affirmed by the court of appeals, should be upheld.

6

Although the court of appeals' opinion does not discuss in depth the award of
damages for the disposal of plaintiffs' personal property, an examination of the briefs
lodged with the court of appeals in Fowler leaves no doubt that the issue of the nature of
and basis for the damages award was squarely before the court. The plaintiffs' appellate
brief included the following statements regarding the damages award: "The jury in a
special verdict determined that Plaintiffs' damage from the unlawful entry was in the
amount of $7,000 based upon the value of the items taken by Defendant." Appellants'
Brief at 8. "The damages resulting from forcible entry include the value of household
goods and personal effects removed." Id, at 9. "Damages resulting from forcible entry
include the value of household goods and personal effects removed from the premises."
Id, at 13, "The natural and proximate consequences of the forcible entry were the
disposal by Defendant of the contents of the storage unit." Id. at 14.
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D.

There Is No Authority for Awarding Fair Rental Value to a Tenant in
a Forcible Detainer Case.

Wasatch argues that damages for forcible detainer are those "relating to [Aris's]
inability to occupy the Premises." Petitioners" Brief at 17. By implication, Wasatch also
argues that what Wasatch characterizes as "the real estate forcible detainer statute" or
"Utah's real property forcible detainer statute," Petitioners' Brief at 18, 19 (emphasis in
original), somehow requires a court to exclude recovery of damage to Aris's personal
property resulting from the forcible detainer. The Court should reject Wasatch's
argument—backed by not a single Utah forcible detainer case—that damages for forcible
detainer consist only of the fair rental value of the premises, rather than damage to
personal property. There is no authority for this. Merely calling the forcible detainer
statute a "real estate" or "real property" statute does not create a legal interpretive basis
for excluding whole categories of damages that a tenant might suffer.
Wasatch appears to have adopted its misguided view from the dissenting opinion
of Judge Orme, who relies exclusively on two unlawful detainer cases for the position
that fair rental value of the premises is the measure of damages for forcible detainer. See
2005 UT App 326 at ]f 37 (Orme, J., dissenting). (The majority opinion even seems
confused by this, conceding that the fair rental value is the minimum of damages
awardable for forcible detainer. See 2005 UT App 326 at \ 31 n.5.)
The first case relied on by Judge Orme regarding fair rental value (in paragraphs
36 and 37 of the opinion) is Forrester v. Cook, an unlawful detainer case in which this
Court addressed whether a landlord's right to recover rents under what is now subsection
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2(d) of the statute (addressed in Point 1(A), above) precludes an award of treble damages
for the rental value of the premises during the unlawful detainer period. See 77 Utah 137,
155-57, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930).7 The Court held that "rents," "which may not be
trebled, are such as accrue before termination of the tenancy" and before commencement
of the unlawful detainer period. Id at 157, id, at 214. In contrast, the landlord's "loss of
the value of the use and occupation of the premises, or the rental value thereof during
the unlawful detainer constitutes damages to be trebled under the statute. Id, at 156, id, at
214.
This remedy of the fair rental value has no place in a forcible detainer action
because a tenant is never entitled to collect rents from the landlord, but instead pays rent
to the landlord to occupy the premises. A tenant can argue (as Aris did below) under
Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 374-78 (Utah 1998), that the
forcible detainer results in abatement of rent, but there is no legal basis for awarding the
rental value to the tenant. As noted above, Section 78-36-10(2) includes remedies for
both landlords and tenants. The remedy of rent, under Subsection (2)(d), could only refer
to a remedy available to a landlord, not to a tenant.
The second case relied on by Judge Orme that relates to fair rental value (at
paragraph 37 of the opinion) does not change this. That case, Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell
770 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), was an unlawful detainer case in which the landlord
was awarded $300 as the "reasonable rental value" of the premises during the unlawful

7

Forrester was overruled on other, unrelated grounds by P.H. Inv. v. Oliver, 818
P.2d 1018, 1020 (Utah 1991)).
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detainer. Id. at 1025-26. Again, neither Monroe nor Forrester was a forcible detainer
case, and it makes no sense to apply the unlawful detainer damages theory of fair rental
value in this forcible detainer action. The Court should reject the view that fair rental
value is a remedy available to tenants in a forcible detainer case.
The key language in Forrester that Wasatch fails to address is that "[t]he plaintiff
is entitled to recover such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences of the
unlawful detainer." .See 77 Utah at 156, 292 P. at 214. That principle has never been
overruled. This language is based on the general damages provision in the statute that
applies to both forcible detainer and unlawful detainer actions—that the trial court "shall
also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from . . . forcible or unlawful detainer."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36- 10(2)(b). The trial court and court of appeals properly applied
this rule here, where the damage to Aris's personal property was the natural and
proximate consequence of the forcible detainer. This Court should affirm the award.
E.

There Is No Authority for Wasatch's Claim That Aris's Damages Are
"Consequential" and Not Awardable.

The Court should also reject Wasatch's argument that Aris's recovery constitutes
"consequential" damages, and that consequential damages cannot be recovered unless
general damages are awarded. See Petitioners' Brief at 21. Not only is this argument not
within the scope of the writ of certiorari, it was not argued before the trial court or the
court of appeals. It is based on the fallacy that the "general" damages awarded for
forcible detainer constitute "reasonable rental value of the Premises," Petitioners' Brief at
21, and that such "general" damages must first be awarded before any consequential

23

damages. To the contrary, the statute does not authorize an award to a tenant of rent or of
damages equal to fair rental value. Since fair rental value is not awardable to tenants, any
recovery in a forcible detainer case will constitute consequential damages under
Wasatch's interpretation. The fact remains that the statute does not limit damages for
harm to personal property.
The forcible detainer statute gives no protection to tenants at all if it cannot be
used to punish landlords like Wasatch who lock out tenants without judicial process for
the sole purpose of seizing the tenant's personal property to use as a bargaining chip to
pay future rents. Since the damages awarded to Aris were "the natural and proximate
consequences" of the forcible detainer, the trial court was within its discretion to award
them, and the court of appeals correctly affirmed.
F.

The Court Should Disregard the Case Law Cited by Wasatch.

Wasatch's three archaic cases from other jurisdictions, see Petitioners' Brief at 19
n.5, provide no guidance in this appeal. First, Arout v. Azar, 219 A.D. 260,219 N.Y.S.
431 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1927), offers no support for Wasatch's position because the New
York court held that the case did not involve a forcible detainer at all. See id. Instead, in
that case "defendants were guilty of a trespass." Id. Moreover, that court offered no
rationale for the statement quoted by Wasatch, so the reader is left to wonder whether the
preclusion of such damages is based upon the statute itself or upon case law interpreting
the statute or based upon nothing at all.
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Second, Carman v. Scott, 137 N.W. 655 (Mich. 1912), like Arout offered no
rationale for its statement that certain damages were not recoverable under the forcible
detainer statute then in effect.
Third, Shaw v. Hoffman, 1872 Mich. LEXIS 91 (1872), provides no helpful
analysis of this issue. Shaw was the primary case relied upon by the Carman court in
holding that damages to personal property were not recoverable under the forcible
detainer statute. However, the court in Shaw offered no more analysis of this issue than
any of the other two cases cited by Wasatch.
Given the complete absence of any analysis of the key issue in any of these cases,
and the contrasting authority of this Court and the court of appeals, the Utah authority
must prevail. The Court should affirm and uphold the trial court's award of damages for
loss, damage and depreciation of Aris's personal property.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BASED ON WASATCH'S FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF TREBLING DAMAGES RESULTING FROM
INJURY TO PERSONAL PROPERTY.
Notwithstanding the Court's writ of certiorari to the court of appeals, the issue of

whether damage to Aris's personal property should be trebled is not properly before the
Court because Wasatch failed to preserve it before the trial court. In fact, Wasatch failed
even to preserve before the court of appeals the narrow issue now before this Court on
certiorari. Rather, the issue now before this Court was raised for the very first time by
Judge Orme in his dissenting opinion. See 2005 UT App 326 at ^ 36-37 (Orme, J.,
dissenting). The lead opinion of the court of appeals only referenced this issue in a
footnote at the end of its opinion as a response to the dissent. See id. at ^f 31 n.5. Thus,
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while the court of appeals affirmed the trial court on the merits, it was equally entitled to
affirm the trial court's trebling of damages based on Wasatch's failure ever to preserve
this issue. This Court may affirm the court of appeals on the same alternative basis.
A.

Preservation Must Occur at the Trial Court

An appellant cannot raise for the first time on appeal arguments that it never gave
the trial court the opportunity to consider. See 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat Inc., 2004
UT 72, f 51, 99 P.3d 801 (citing Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT
48, Tf 14, 48 P.3d 968). It is axiomatic that preservation occur before the trial court, and
not at an intermediate appellate court. See id ("'In order to preserve and issue for
appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has
an opportunity to rule on the issue.'") (quoting Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at ^ 14) (emphasis
supplied).8 "For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error, '(1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and
(3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority.'" Id (quoting Brookside, 2002 UT 48 at ^ 14). As the court of appeals has
observed, "[m]ere mention" of an issue in trial pleadings, without supporting evidence or
The instant case presents the unusual circumstance where the issue on which this
Court grants certiorari was never preserved by the petitioner. A similar scenario arose in
the recent case of B.A.M. Development, L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 2006 UT 2, _ P.3d
, where the respondent made a lack of preservation argument after issuance of a writ of
certiorari, but the Court in its discretion determined to address the merits anyway. See id,
at Tf 24 ("While it may be possible to imagine circumstances under which we might
reconsider a grant of certiorari on an issue we later conclude was not properly preserved,
that is not the case here, and we take up the issue on its merits."). Here, there is little
reason for this Court to review an issue that, as discussed below, was never raised at the
trial court but was raised for the first time in a dissenting opinion from a court of appeals
judge.
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legal authority, is insufficient. LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., 823 P.2d 479, 48283(UtahCt.App. 1991).
B.

Wasatch Failed to Preserve at the Trial Court Whether Damages to
Personal Property Are Recoverable Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10.

At the trial court, Wasatch never even hinted that Aris could not recover under the
forcible detainer statute for injury to its personal property. However, the trial court
provided to the parties "an adequate opportunity to speak to all the issues" [R.529 at
569]—and thus preserve arguments—through trial briefs [R. 189-208, 217-36], opening
statements [R.526 at 18-35], both written and oral closing arguments [R.265-86, 287311; 529:544-81], and then even written replies [R.346-68]. After all this, Wasatch
hired new counsel and has attempted to raise new arguments on appeal, without setting
forth any ground for reviewing unpreserved issues. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B)
("The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . a statement of grounds for seeking review of
an issue not preserved in the trial court.").
Wasatch fails to concede this mistake. In the preservation section on page 2 of
Wasatch's brief, it cites voluminous pages of various trial briefs and transcripts that have
absolutely nothing to do with the issue now before this Court:
1.

R.103-12: This is Wasatch's answer and counterclaim, which is

silent on this issue.
2.

R. 169-76: This is Wasatch's portion of the pretrial order, none of

which addresses the issue raised by this appeal, but instead addresses other,
unrelated defenses to the forcible detainer claim. [R. 176-77.]
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3.

R.217-26: This is the fact section of Wasatch's trial brief. The legal

issue of trebling of damages cannot be preserved by merely alleging facts.
4.

R.230-31: This is the section of Wasatch's trial brief that relates to

forcible detainer, not a single sentence of which suggests that trebling of damages
to personal property is inappropriate.
5.

R.346-56: This is Wasatch's supplemental, post-closing-argument

brief, which only addressed Wasatch's view of the evidence, but still includes no
argument nor authority regarding whether Aris's damages could be trebled.
6.

R.529 at 558-79: These are the transcript pages of closing

argument, which is wholly devoid even of the word "trebling."
7.

R.304-07: This is the forcible detainer argument from Wasatch's

written closing argument brief, which raises other, unrelated defenses to trebling.
In sum, not one portion of the trial record cited by Wasatch—which included
numerous pretrial and post-trial briefs—contains any argument or authority regarding
whether damages to personal property can be awarded and trebled under the forcible
detainer statute. As a result, the court of appeals was not obligated to address this issue
on the merits, but was entitled to affirm the trial court on preservation grounds. While
the court of appeals nevertheless affirmed on the merits, this Court is entitled to affirm—
and should affirm—on the alternative basis of Wasatch's failure to preserve the treble
damages issue. See American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, ^f 7, 63 P.3d 675
(holding that this Court "'may affirm the court of appeals' decision on any ground
supported in the record.'") (quoting Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT
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77, H 11, 52 P.3d 1267); see also, e.g.. State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65, «|[ 3, 123 P.3d 407
(affmning judgment on "alternate grounds" to those expressed by court of appeals);
Anderson v. Wilshire Invs., L.L.C., 2005 UT 59, T| 6, 123 P.3d 393 (same).
C.

Wasatch Failed to Raise Before the Court of Appeals Whether Damage
to Personal Property Is Recoverable Under Section 78-36-10.

Not only did Wasatch fail to preserve before the trial court the issue now before
this Court, but it also failed to raise the issue before the court of appeals. Indeed, Judge
Orme in his dissenting opinion was the first in the course of this litigation to suggest that
injury to personal property should not be compensated under the forcible detainer statute.
See 2005 UT App 326 at ^ 36-37 (Orme, J., dissenting). While the majority address
this issue, it does so only as a counterargument to the dissent in a footnote at the end of
the lead opinion. See id. at ^[31 n.5.
Wasatch nevertheless suggests in the preservation section of its brief that it
preserved the issue (of awarding damages under the forcible detainer statute for harm to
personal property) before the court of appeals, but Wasatch cites only the court of appeals
opinion itself, see Petitioners' Brief at 2, rather than Wasatch's own briefs to the court of
appeals, which were devoid of any meaningful discussion of this issue or relevant
authority. Wasatch seems to suggest that the court of appeals satisfied Wasatch's
preservation burden for it, but Wasatch ignores that the preservation duty is met at the
trial level—not on appeal. See Point 11(A), above. Moreover, even if its burden to
preserve could be met before the court of appeals, Wasatch still failed to meet this burden
because its briefs and argument to the court of appeals lack any specific argument or
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relevant legal authority. Again, this Court may affirm the court of appeals based on
Wasatch's failure to preserve the limited issue now before this Court on certiorari.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Respondent Aris Vision Institute, Inc., respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the ruling of the court of appeals, which upheld the trebling of
damages caused by Wasatch's forcible detainer. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3610(3) and the lease between the parties, Aris respectfully requests an award of the
attorney fees and costs that Aris has incurred in connection with Wasatch's appeals, and
such additional and further relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DATED this 1 > day of January, 2006.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

R. Stephen Marshalk^3
Erik A. Olson
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee Aris
Vision Institute, Inc.
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INC., a Utah corporation, DAVID SKALKAy
an individual, BRIAN SKALKA, an * .
individual, and DENNIS PEACOCK, an J
individual,
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This matter came before the Court at a bench trial on October 14, 15, and 16,
2003. Closing argument was held on November 14, 2003. The parties submitted written closing
argument briefs and submitted written responses to the written closing argument briefs. Plaintiff
Aris Vision Institute, Inc., was represented ai trial by R. Stephen Marshall of the law firm of

Deputy Cle'k

Durham Jones & Pinegar and defendants Wasatch Property Management, Inc., and JDJ
Properties, Inc., were represented by Todd D. Weiler of the law firm of Parry Anderson &
Gardiner. Defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis Peacock have not been served
with process in this matter and have not entered appearances. Claims against the three unserved
defendants were not litigated at trial.
Having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, the Court entered its
memorandum decision in this matter on January 22, 2004, in which the Court directed counsel
for plaintiff to prepare written findings of fact and conclusions of law. Based on the arguments
of the parties, the testimony and credibility of witnesses at trial, the exhibits and other evidence
presented at trial, subsequent oral and written submissions to the Court, the Court's
memorandum decision, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters its findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris"), a California company, owned

and operated a laser eye surgery center (the "Center") located in Suites 100 and 120 (the
"Premises") within the Woodlands Business Park Tower I in Murray, Utah (the "Building").
2.

Aris employed David Skalka ("Skalka") as Center manager and contracted

with four physicians who agreed to perform eye surgeries at the Center (the "Doctors").
3.

Aris handled the bills for the Center, including all rental payments to the

landlord.
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4.

Aris placed in the Premises furniture and multiple pieces of surgical

equipment, including three VISX model S-2 lasers, which were needed to operate the Center.
5.

Aris owned all of the equipment and furniture that it placed on the

Premises, including the three lasers.
6.

Pursuant to a written lease agreement (the "Lease"), Aris leased the

Premises from defendant JDJ Properties, Inc., ("JDJ").
7.

Aris deposited with JDJ the sum of $13,393.89 as a security deposit to

secure the Lease.
8.

JDJ had an agreement with its sister company, Wasatch Property

Management, Inc., ("Wasatch"), under which Wasatch agreed to manage the Building and collect
rents from tenants. All of Wasatch's actions in this matter were within the scope of its agency
and responsibilities delegated to it by JDJ.
9.

From its Logan, Utah headquarters, Wasatch directed all invoices relating

to the Premises to Aris's Los Angeles, California headquarters, and Aris mailed all payments,
including rents, from Aris's headquarters to Wasatch's headquarters.
10.

Long before Aris hired Skalka and the Doctors and opened the Center,

Skalka and the Doctors had been tenants within the Building and had enjoyed a long-standing
relationship with Wasatch. Francis Wapner, one of the Doctors, had even performed vision
correction surgery for Dennis Peacock ("Peacock"), Wasatch's property manager for the
Building, and Dell Loy Hansen, the owner of JDJ and Wasatch.
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11.

After a severe downturn in the laser eye surgery business, Aris determined

to close the Center, along with other centers across the United States.
12.

On January 4, 2002, Aris terminated several employees, including Skalka,

and provided various notices to Skalka and vendors that Aris was "in the unfortunate position of
having to wind down it[s] current operations and liquidate its business prior to dissolution."
13.

At the time, Aris sought to sell to Skalka and the Doctors all of Aris's

property located on the Premises, and to have Skalka and the Doctors assume Aris's obligations
under the Lease.
14.

Through February 9, 2002, while those negotiations moved forward,

Skalka and the Doctors continued to occupy the Premises and performed surgeries on the
Premises using Aris's equipment.
15.

Aris did not pay its January rent in the amount of $9,556.38 by January 1,

2002, when it was due pursuant to the Lease.
16.

Sometime after the 1 st of January, Peacock and Anita Lockhart

("Lockhart"), Wasatch's property managers, confronted Skalka regarding the missed January rent
payment.
17.

Skalka told them about his termination and Aris's financial trouble, and

provided copies of the notices he had received from Aris, which indicated that Aris (1) had
terminated Skalka's employment; (2) was ceasing all operations; and (3) would likely file for
bankruptcy protection.
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18.

Peacock responded to Skalka that Aris's equipment and furniture could

not be removed Iroin Ihc Premises undei ;mv i in iimslanrrs
19.

Skalka had already informed Lockhari m 1 ale 20f\ nu; \ris w^,JJ HU r *

bankruptcy and that Skalka and the doctors were going to sepa; JK I:-. :.
20.

.s.

By abuul mid laiiiiarv 2002, Aris's negotiations with Skalka and the

Doctors proved unsuccessful, and Aris elected to inventory, remove, and sell its furniture and
equipment to pay esea.a;,:_ v.i: - s.
21.

Aris arranged for the sale of its uuuiprnent and furniture, and sent its

regional manager, Richard Fnrijrht from Tali fu iiu... • ...:;• i ui; isc& ,* •,
arranged

.

s , v<; : < --„

-e and store all oi Aris's proper!} poiicim^ its

sale.
22.

On January 21, 2un ,'. heloie I lie movini' eumpam' was sehcdul*1'1 loap've

H:vmisc-: ! •"right arrived at the Building and proceeded directly to the Premises, where he
met Skalka.
23.

liririjijil inlnnncd Sknlk.i lh.il lit" had come to remove all of Aris's furniture

and equipment.
24.

Based un Kaeock ,s dnn.liu 1 lh.il nr pinpnB < «mkl W n mo\nl Skalka

refused to permit Enright to remove the equipment and funnuire. and advised Enright to speak
directly to Peacock,
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25.

Skalka escorted Enright to Peacock's office within the Building, and

introduced Enright to Peacock. Enright identified himself to Peacock as an Aris employee, and
expressed his intention of removing Aris's equipment and furniture from the Premises.
26.

Peacock refused to release any equipment or furniture to Enright, and

informed Enright that Aris had abandoned the Premises and had defaulted under the Lease by
failing to pay its January rent. As a result, according to Peacock, Wasatch was entitled to seize
Aris's personal property.
27.

Enright tendered a check to Peacock for the January rent, but Peacock

responded that Wasatch would not accept it.
28.

While Enright was in Peacock's office, Peacock was contacted via

telephone by Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), Aris's CFO, who informed him that Enright was an
authorized representative of Aris, and requested that Peacock release all of Aris's property to
Enright.
29.

Peacock repeated to Soto that Aris had abandoned the Premises under

paragraph 20.1 of the Lease, and had defaulted under the Lease by failing to pay its January rent.
As a result, according to Peacock, Wasatch was entitled to seize Aris's personal property.
30.

Soto responded to Peacock that Aris was pursuing its right under

paragraph 20.1 of the Lease to remove its personal property before surrendering the premises.
31.

Like Enright, Soto offered to pay the January rent payment immediately

via wire transfer, but Peacock indicated that such payment was too late and would not be
accepted.

6

32,

After Peacock completed his telephone conversation with Soto, Enright

again insisted that he be pcmullwl lo remove Aris\s pioperly.
33<

Instead of releasing Aris' property, however, Peacock directed Enright to

leave the Premises immediately and threatened to have the poli.ee forcefull} remov e Enright if he

T\yc\i\wl d\] nri .onlaei an> other representatives of Aris at liu, lime, nor
did he ever set., .

.

,*

'

*^ •--•• • ^

. ,.i.

headquarters to verify the statements made by Enright and Soto.
35
removing any

Pursuant to Peacock .s uUiiuiki. www.. ..

-i:*..^

'fit m furniture.
The Court is not persuaded by Peacock's testi.rn.ony that he turned hnngm

away because lie did not kno v wlni lit w JN Peacock conenlnl dial WiisaU'irs main fllce would
have had Aiis's California contact information. Yet, Peacock never even sought this information
before turning Enright away, instead favoring Skalka, whom Peacock, knevs had been terminated
i in I.iiiiii.irv 21, 2004, the day after Enright's visit to the Premises, Aris
filed this action seeking replevin of its property and. damages.
iliunl1, .illi.T htiij'jit s (iituiimi'i 'oiiiili IV.iuuk I<rik Olson ("Olson"),
counsel for Aris, contacted Dahlstrom and requested that Wasatch, permit Aris to remove its
property from the Premises. Olson also tendered m .i I IU'I In I >alilstiniii \MS1 . bun in u nJ
payment.
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39.

Dahlstrom refused to release the equipment and furniture to Axis, and did

not accept the tender of January rent.
40.

Dahlstrom proposed that Aris consider a "business solution" under which

Aris would sell its equipment and furniture to Skalka and the Doctors, and Skalka and the
Doctors would assume the Lease obligations to Wasatch. Aris agreed to pursue such an
arrangement.
41.

However, no one from JDJ or Wasatch disclosed to any representative of

Axis that Lockhart had been working with Skalka and the Doctors since mid-2001 to set up a
competing laser eye surgery center in another space within the Building at a more advantageous
rent. No one disclosed to Axis that Skalka and the Doctors indeed consummated a new lease
with Wasatch dated January 1, 2002, for another space within the Building that had been vacant
for some time. Wasatch had a tremendous amount of vacant space in 2001 and 2002.
42.

There is no credible evidence that Wasatch had attempted at any time prior

to January 22, 2002, to negotiate with Skalka and the Doctors to remain in the Premises, rather
than relocate to another suite within the Building.
43.

By relocating Skalka and the Doctors within the Building, Wasatch

intended to eliminate that vacancy and then look to Axis for payment of the full rent for the
Premises.
44.

With Skalka and the Doctors relocated and Axis in financial trouble,

Wasatch believed that holding Axis's personal property was a way to insure that JDJ would be
paid under the Lease. Moreover, by providing to Skalka and the Doctors a substantially more
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favorable lease in the same building, Wasatch made it unlikely that the Doctors would assume
An - .-s lease.
45.

No agreement was reached among Aris, Wasatch, Skalka, and m, Doctors

with respect to re-leasing the Premises to Skalka and the Doctors.
46.

On or sliorlls a fin* I'Hinmrv (K 2002, Skalka and the Doctors vacated the

Premises and repealed within the Buikhm: pursuant to ihch >\c\\ lease Wasatch never
supervisea t>kai'... ^.iv. j'.^. j'-cv; • .i^v
47.

• -.

•

• -remises.

Sometime after Skalka and the Doctors vacated the Premises, Wasatch

changed the locks to the Premises, but never provide.: .• KC\ •- v. >s and never advised. .Aris that
llu lih ks had been t.luiignf
48.

•

'•

On Februdt \ i 5, 2002, Aris served on Dahlstrom a motion for a writ of

replevin in which Aris sought a I cant oulei icsloniig h\ \nu ill nl nK p<

ISOIUII

pmpul, li»rafed

on the Premises. The Court scheduled a hearing on the motion for February 26, 2002, and
Dahlstrom received notice of the hearing on. the 21st of February.
49.

Afln" n vri\

IIIJJ

the motion lor writ of replevin and the notice of hearing,

Dahlstrom did not relent. He informed Olson, that he would oppose the motion for writ of
replevin.
50.

Dahlstrom asked for more time to prepare .for the hearing, and. Olson

agreed to postpone the hearing until Mai ch 5, 200.2.
51

; • •. \ .• L-ai!::—,<p to the hearing, Dahlstrom never conceded that Aris

was entitled, to replevin of its personal property. Rather, he indicated his intention to oppose the
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motion for writ of replevin, and warned that Aris would have to post a bond of hundreds of
thousands of dollars to secure the writ.
52.

Based on Dahlstrom's opposition to the replevin and insistence on a

sizeable bond, Aris agreed to postpone indefinitely the March 5, 2002, hearing and work with
Wasatch to locate a new tenant for the Premises.
53.

By agreeing to postpone the writ of replevin hearing and by working with

Wasatch to find a new tenant for the Premises, neither Olson nor Aris ever intended to waive,
settle, or release any claims set forth in this action, including its claims for replevin, conversion,
wrongful eviction, and forcible detainer.
54.

In fact, there was no settlement at all between Aris and Wasatch. Olson

and Aris's agreement with Wasatch was nothing more than an agreement to postpone the
litigation to find any tenant who could use the space, as a means of reducing JDJ's claimed
damages, avoiding the expense to Aris of posting a bond to secure the release of its property, and
determining whether a settlement between Aris and Wasatch could be reached.
55.

Aris did not postpone the replevin hearing for the narrow purpose of

attempting to re-let the premises to another laser surgery center tenant. While Aris attempted to
make the best of the situation (such as locating Ed Barber and attempting to place Barber's group
in the space), it was a remote possibility that a laser eye surgery tenant would relocate to the
space when Skalka and the doctors conducted the same business downstairs.
56.

After the writ of replevin hearing was stricken from the Court's calendar,

Dahlstrom and Olson worked together for a few months to resolve this matter in a manner that was
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equitable for both sides. However, Mr. Peacock and other agents of Wasatch did nol share this
.

- K . I

^

i •

.

•

r

*

'-'

"»• r -

• !']'•

•

* \ drums occasions bc;ween March and lime 2002. -\ri> repicsentat : ves
wereprovidec; \ ^ . „ ; ; . L . 4 , .,i.per\ isee ae^es- ,>

•.

•-

.a-. y t . ; -

:-:ained Wasatch's permission and was accompanied by Peacock, who was the only
individual with a key to the Premises.
ill

Ik'H'h \ isil wns ruoniiiulnl v\ illi ,itul supervised by Peacock, who would

unlock the doo* and stand IIIUMJ V«P the Premises As 'eacock conceded

"safer :,IT.! mcaiii mat he wab nol to ahovv anyone

including Ans

; .va> hi.* '

K

to

to take an> equipmen: or

furniture oui - r iLe Buildhu.
"- ^t s, .

ventoried its PCTM -

:•<

Enright disco\cred Lhal three nieces of equipment had been lemmed noni the Premies ben* eon
his January 22, JiiOJ, visit ami his Mauii JiMiJ invciil< u \

(

a.

Statim autoclave (item 230 on PL Ex. 21);

1

—onipaq laptop (item.. 601 on PL Ex. 21); and

c.

'••,:•

4*.' f.

v iiem

i iJ7 on PL Ex. 21).

\udm''.iial!y. hnright discovered that several pairs of high-end sunglasses

were removed from,, the pren lises between Jai i/t lai ) 22, 2002, and I\ larch 2002.
Oi.

Aris's inventories also discovered \\\.\\ \\\^ of - n s ' s lasers had sustained.

damage after Axis was excluded from, the Premises. According to credible icsuiriv-
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-\ -• o,

which was uncontroverted, one laser's microscope was broken off, rendering the laser
inoperable, and the assembly head covers on two lasers (including the laser with the damaged
scope) were also damaged, rendering the lasers inoperable.
62.

Credible testimony from Soto established that these two damaged lasers

had been operable immediately prior to Skalka and the Doctors vacating the Premises because
VISX, the laser manufacturer, had issued "key cards" to Skalka and the Doctors enabling them to
use the lasers up until they vacated on or about February 9, 2002. Thus, the damage sustained by
the lasers occurred at the time—or after—Skalka and the Doctors vacated.
63.

During one supervised visit to the Premises, Aris and Olson convinced

Peacock to release one small piece of equipment, but Peacock confirmed that no other articles
were to be removed.
64.

On May 20, 2002, Aris memorialized an asset purchase agreement, under

which Aris agreed to sell a few pieces of its equipment to Ed Barber, who operated a laser eye
surgery center, for $35,000 cash. Aris and Wasatch also attempted to persuade Barber to
negotiate a new lease for the Premises. Barber ultimately was interested only in purchasing the
equipment, and not leasing the Premises.
65.

Olson sought Dahlstrom's consent to the sale based on Wasatch's prior

edict that no equipment or furniture be removed, and sent to Dahlstrom for his review a copy of
an asset purchase agreement between Aris and Barber. Dahlstrom indicated that he would check
with Wasatch, but did not anticipate any problem.
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66,

~lson arranged with Peacock and Barber a. meeting on nn. Premises—
lu i lusi. (hi* ^(iiiipiikiil .all MI 1 • III• 10 ,}f)02. Olson, Lnrighi, and Soto

supotN ned b> IV<n ui t

attended the meeting for Aris. Barber attended the meeting. Glen McKay represented Wasatch
at the meeting, along with Peacock. At the meeting, i \ i is and Barbei signed the asset pi irehase
agreement for (lie $35,000 of Aris's equipment.
(•confirm lhal (hi .:--

- >urine the meeting, Olson telephoned Pnhlstrom lrom ID i'ru.usu. \
..

' • :

'

:-••.*

"• ;

ng that Wasatch liau nut yet

approved the transaction. Aris then left the meeting without the $35,000, and Barber left the
meeting without the equipment.
68.

A few days later, Dahlstrom telephoned Olson .and indicated that Wasatch

would onlypemi.it Aris to sell the equipment to Barber if Vv pum a^. eiit,iL V :\

u

3

;IM... .IS

On or about June il;. 2002, Salt Lake County posted a notice of seizure on

the Premises setting forth an indebtedness Iroin Ans i.i Hit1 .tinow.1 ul I ' 4,J I1* lor pi peih " r "s
ii ml IT I, i led fees.
70
, . ,:Jl. | t .

Shortly after the notice of seizure was posted on the Premises, Peacock
...:..

u n,

he failed to notify Aris that he had

changed the locks, and failed to provide a key to any representative of Aris,
, \l '»! .il•-11rI lite lime Peacock t li.itip.il \hv In k\ .1 senmd linn , Nal,.
traveled from California to the Premises with the intention of breaking the locks on the Premises
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doors and removing all of Aris's property. She had contacted a locksmith and moving company
for these purposes.
72.

However, discovering the notice of seizure posted on the Premises, Soto

went to the Salt Lake County Assessor's office and paid the entire indebtedness. She then
decided not to proceed with the locksmith and moving company that day because it appeared that
Wasatch employees were guarding the Premises.
73.

Shortly after Soto's visit to the Premises, Olson contacted Dahlstrom and

informed him that Aris had no intention of paying any proceeds from the Barber sale to Wasatch,
and intended instead to proceed with the lawsuit, including the writ for replevin of Aris's
equipment and furniture.
74.

On or about June 25, 2002, Dahlstrom informed Olson for the first time

that Wasatch never intended to withhold any of Aris's personal property and that Aris was
entitled to remove it all.
75.

Peacock received an e-mail from Lockhart on June 26, 2002, directing him

to release Aris's property. Peacock responded to Lockhart, "Is this correct?" Lockhart then
replied to Peacock that Aris was now allowed to take all of its personal property from the
Premises.
76.

The Court finds that the directive Peacock received from Lockhart on June

26 and 28, 2002, to release Aris's equipment and furniture was a change from previous
instructions. Based on Peacock and Lockhart's e-mail exchange, the Court finds that Peacock
previously had been instructed not to allow Aris to remove its equipment and furniture.
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"i1 >n July 2, 2002, Soto removed all of Ans's personal property trom Hit

7/

Premises, and sold a poriion oi iln1 equifHiieei lo Barber lor $^,,000 as previously agreed.
78.

As both Soto and Aris's expert. Richard I lokircn * 1 loidrci. u testified,

laser surgery equipment depreciates extrem^«. ..;
models an: released rvn \ 1 Z1 t<> I j; months. ^

*

•

.•..-*.

boio s credible testimony indicated, Ans could

have obtained $200,000 for the lasers in January 2002 and only $55,000 lo $C)U,UU0 JOT ilie hism
in July 2002.
79.

As detailed in Holdren's report, the total amount by which Aris's personal

property depreciated while it was within Wasatch's enM-•.ni

-

s

*-

* -«,

any febul'ktl oxpul en ntlicnvisc offer any rebuttal testimony i elating to the deprcciatu^ of \"-* property.
80.
.;,.

i%

*

As IJoldn II s uiitoiifioverfed expert te>«Jjnion\ established, the value of the

"-Mient that became missing from the Premises between January 22, 2002, and

Enrighi N HIYCIU;T\ T. March and April 2002 was as follows al (he lnne \ n s w.is pennilteil l<i
ren •,

81
1

a.

Statim autoclave (item 230 on PL Ex. 21): $393.60;

b.

i.oni]JcU|_ui|)H/j

c.

Hansatome microkeratome (iteir \ ! 3 ' i-r: PI h \ J: 1): $14,164.68.

•

i

^~-+9.S: ,uiu

As credible, uncontroverteu i'j.s::ni* .• r^..-. w. ;;r -^ji- ^i-

• > ••.. u itijijasscs was $985.56.
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82.

After removing its personal property from the Premises, Aris sold the two

damaged lasers to VISX, which credited the value of the lasers against Aris's debt to VISX. As
Soto's credible, uncontroverted testimony established, based on the damage that the lasers had
sustained, VISX deducted $53,000 from the credit Aris received. The third laser was sold to
VISX at a loss.
83.

While the three lasers had been secured by collateralized loans to

Newcourt Financial and Imperial Bank, Aris paid off both of those loans sometime after Aris was
enabled to remove the lasers from the Premises.
84.

Wasatch produced no credible evidence at trial to controvert Soto's

credible testimony that Aris owned all of the personal property on the Premises, including the
three lasers.
85.

Neither Wasatch nor JDJ has ever had a property interest in any of the

furniture or equipment that was located on the Premises. Nor was any credible evidence received
at trial of other potential claimants to Aris's personal property, much less claimants who had
authorized Wasatch to seize the property.
86.

Wasatch knew as early as January 22, 2002, that Aris wanted access to the

Premises to remove its belongings. From this date up until the date Soto removed Aris's
property, Wasatch refused repeated requests by Aris representatives for permission to remove
Aris's property. On multiple occasions, Wasatch prevented Aris from entering into the Premises
with intent to deprive Aris of such entry.
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87.

During this period, Aris did not have free and unfettered access to the

Prei nises i 101 ecu ild it remo\ e its personal proper ty fi om the Premises From the time Wasatch
changed the locks, Aris had no keys to the Premises. As a result, Aris could have removed its
equipment and ..:

•-:, .r.

* nreakim; • •

, - . • . . .

Wasatch's permission.
88.
posses:,.-:

*
KO

Wasatch never sought the assistance of UK ( uiu; m e\ idmy. . \ is, taking
--.;•.

.

•- -

- •-

• -.! • -

-\y,

\\ nijc -Xns1- personal property VA as u\ V^ asatch *. custody, Wasatch was

not merely safeguaNn.ii, i;i.* i)iwj>eny J... . .

*

:•

Wasatch consider Aiis% —r^(^\ to be merel> "stored" at the Premises To the contrar\ because
Wasatch knew that Aris was in financial trouble, Wasatch re!us<_u u •.;.

\ ^, -

r ^:

.».i

propertj to be i elease d, and instead used it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Aris with
respect to the payment of rent,
00

There is no credible evidence thai AM1 vvvt \ a u t a l (In Premis'". pi""" '"

-'.*.ir"'-- '""?. lOvZ. Likewise, there is no credible evidence that Aris intended or offered to
.surrender the Lease, much less any evidence that Wasatch or JDJ mte-.^L-ii to accept such
surrender Rathei, Aris\ per.Nii.il |)io(n if\ iriihUiiol uii Hie Premises, and Skalka and the
Doctors continued to occupy the Premises until February 9, 2002.
91.

>nuv h'iii oi k leiiisi tl Ui it lease Aii'i » personal propcil\

preventing Aris from selling it and reaching a settlement with Wasatch
surrender the lease.
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linns

Ans was unable to

92.

On or about July 24, 2002, JDJ entered into a new lease for the Premises

with Utah Financial. Utah Financial took occupancy of the Premises on September 1, 2002.
93.

Since relocating within the Building, Skalka and the Doctors have

negotiated with Wasatch to build out a new, larger surgery center for them in an expensive, mainfloor-level space in an adjacent building owned by JDJ.
94.

As of January 4, 2002, Aris did not conduct any further business in Utah,

apart from the isolated transaction of selling $35,000 of equipment to Barber. Aris negotiated to
sell equipment in Utah to Barber and no one else. The asset purchase agreement with Barber was
negotiated on May 20, 2002, and the sale would have closed on June 10, 2002, had not Wasatch
refused to allow the equipment to be released.
95.

On May 23, 2002, Aris's registration to do business in Utah expired for

failure to file a renewal.
96.

In the answer that Wasatch and JDJ filed in this action, Wasatch and JDJ

never raised insufficiency of process as an affirmative defense, nor did they allege any failure to
comply with indorsement provisions or other requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 (2002).
97.

Based on the affidavit of attorney fees of R. Stephen Marshall, the Court

finds that Aris has incurred attorney fees in connection with this action in the amount of
$

.

98.

Based on the affidavit of attorney fees of R. Stephen Marshall, the Court

finds that Aris has incurred costs and necessary disbursements in connection with this action in
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the amount of $
i,-: : u

bi .-

. Th^ ( * a ; ;n<w. u.a; : u^u K-:,V J . -_- >^
• :• •

••

n in this action.

CONCLUSIONS OF L A W
1.

• - • •.

/•

"* •

•. n fettered access to the

Premises. T h e limited, supervised mspi vnuii opportunities that Wasatch offered to Aris -A ere not
an adequate substitute for the type ol \rco access that accompany « ^ ^ r -i.
f

••..'<.

'H>

.

;

p=

r '"ight of the tenant to have a key to the Premises, Aris

did not need to ask for a key to access its own property,
2

y t,iU

.

^ ^Ue Aris from the

p r e m * s e s w jtj 10 ,- jrijjcial process and thereby exclude An.- :>oni n-nnn ing its personal
property.
3.

P v a^rn-'-v; t;-. v " w- lie the writ of replevin hearing and working with

Wasatch to iim- .. new tenant h-r the Premises, .Aris did not waive, settle, or release any claims
set forth in this action, nuliuliiii il.>i l.imis lur upli sm i m m i ;IHH wnnigtiil eviction, and
forcible detainer. There was n o settlement between Aris and Wasatch.
4.

A t all r e l e v a n t 11...e.>. i**w.uOvK, . . - . ;

* ••

- -.

^

niilliiii Hit s r n p r >f I heir e m p l o y m e n t b y W a s a t c h .

5.
'dv. • \

A t all relevant times, Wasatch and its employees were acting as authorized
•

6.

"hin the scope of its agency.

JDJ is the "owner" of the Premises as that term is defined in Utah Code

Ann. §78-36-1 J..4( fc !)(Jt)0J).

iy

7.

By the acts of Wasatch, JDJ's duly authorized agent, JDJ willfully and

unlawfully excluded Aris from the Premises without judicial process in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §78-36-12(2002).
8.

Wasatch and JDJ's exclusion of Aris from the Premises and denial of

access to Aris's personal property (including removal of the same) constituted a wrongful
eviction and conversion.
9.

Wasatch and JDJ's forceful, unlawful possession of the Premises during

Aris's tenancy constituted a forcible detainer as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-2
(2002).
10.

Wasatch and JDJ were not acting as—and had no authority to act as—

agents of Salt Lake County, Imperial Bank, Newcourt Financial, or any other creditor of Aris
when Wasatch and JDJ seized Aris's equipment and furniture.
11.

Likewise, the facts of Aris's collateralized loans or the June 19, 2002, tax

lien notice provide no excuse for Wasatch and JDJ's conversion of Aris's personal property.
12.

As Wasatch and JDJ conceded at trial, the Lease did not provide a security

interest to JDJ or Wasatch. Absent such a security interest, JDJ and Wasatch had no right to selfhelp seizure of the equipment and furniture on the Premises.
13.

Aris is entitled to an award of damages against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly

and severally, in the amount of all damages proximately caused by Wasatch and JDJ's wrongful
eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer.
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•

The wrongful eviction, conversion, and forcible detainer each proximately

caused tin: fnlluvniijj' damage1- In An1'
a.

$118,568.81, representing the depreciation of Aris's equipment and

(uniiUire lor the tunc period in whirl) \\ asah'li ami ,11 M depin ed \ n s ml the
property located on the Premises;
b.

$16,118.82, representing the aggregate value v»; Die sia m

iiiitnn LPI'L", i't nH|*fu) laptop ,\m\ h.in^iiliiiiic inn rokemtor. •* -; i sun^ki.ses that
were missing from the Premises;
c.

$53,000,00, representing the damage thai \ i is's lasers sustained

while in Wasatch and JDJ's possession.
Pursuant to the forcible detainer statute, Utah Code Ann :• •*> ...-•» ) .
(J"()2) '\iis is nid'il'.'tl lo »i in )' diiloi1, '" Mini1 of Ms d.unao'^ a^ainsl V--' {^".-h <rnd ' • \ - - ' ^
and severally, which totals $563,062.90 (three tim.es the total damages m the amouni \*
$187,687.63).
I "

' !1ic (Ynirt does not conclude that Aris is entitled to punitive damages

against Wasatch or JDJ because Aris has not met its burden of showing that Wasatch or JDJ" s
in lions demo"1 '• *" • ! " " " " ,

" ii1 •••^4<|!^o n^iino f ,, n i ; r inwunl, o r disregard of, Aris's rights.

Utah Code An" - "S i 8-1 i. *: -2 *
.,.. JO xjnuiieu .• !*_• -.J! i
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txttnh deposit mi Ihe MIIIONIII ol %\ \ 4*M X*!"

18.

Wasatch did not accept Aris's tender of its January, 2002, rent. Utah

Code Ann. § 78-27-1. Nevertheless, as Aris conceded at trial, Aris's damages must be offset
by the amount of the January rent due, $9,556.38.
19.

JDJ's obligation under the Lease to provide free, unfettered access to the

Premises and any personal property located on the Premises, and Aris's obligation under the
Lease to make rental payments, were mutually dependent leasehold covenants.
20.

Based on the doctrine of mutually dependent covenants recognized in

Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 374-78 (Utah 1996), and other
authorities set forth therein, the Court concludes that when JDJ and Wasatch wrongfully evicted
Aris and excluded Aris from the entirety of the Premises (including prohibiting Aris from
accessing and removing its property), Aris's rental obligations were abated in their entirety.
21.

Moreover, based on Wasatch and JDJ's improper conduct, the Lease was

terminated and Aris was relieved of any further obligations thereunder.
22.

JDJ's counterclaim should therefore be dismissed.

23.

Pursuant to Paragraph 26.17 of the Lease and Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-

10(3), Aris is entitled to recover from Wasatch and JDJ its attorney's fees and costs.
24.

After evaluating a number of factors, including the difficulty of the

litigation, the efficiency of Aris's attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the
number of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case, the result attained, and the expertise and experience of

22

du lawyers involved, the Court concludes that \i\* is CIUJUC^ ,j an award ol reasonable atloniey
k\\ in I In: iinioiifil ol "t
25.

.

Aris is also entitled to an award of necessarily incurred costs and

disbursements :;• use amouni >• $
26.

.

Aris's sa.u ol SJevOH1 M equipment h> Barber did ;u i ^i^iiun ;

"transacting business" within the meaning oil ..„. -a, v.
27

).

A dditionally and alternatively, the sale to Barber was merely an "isolated

transaction" vinlnsi (lie incaninr,oi Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1501(2)(j) (2001). If not for
Wasatch's bei.-\;iL M . •

••

i lipment v oiild ha \,re been

- -.;

consummated within 30 days.
28.

Vis uiw iioi "transact business .\.i;.

.;;, ih/.r' -^

. *' * * u ceased operations in Utah on January 4, 2002
29.

irsiuir. V i 'ial: Code Ann. § 1640a 1501(3) (2001), Aris was authorized

* "'-nig and prosecute llns a» Imn

\ , ,\ ii\\itll 111 HI «ni(I \A/'i»*tlir*|n\ mnimi) h» dismiss ''bouki be

denied.
30.

Pursuant to Ride IJ ol tlie I Itah Rules ei Civil 'hroeenlme W i1 tfelli and

J111 have waiv rd .my defense of insufficiency of process or failure to comply with indorsement
requirements or other provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8 (2002).
v '• • • • i

•

•

; either a surrender or

acceptance. Aris never surrendered its tenancy to .»' I > J • ,or did Aris at any point in time ever

23

5^

"abandon" the Premises as "abandonment" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-12.3 and
Fashion Place Assocs. v. Glad Rags, Inc., 754 P.2d 940, 941 (Utah 1988).
32.

Service of process on defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis

Peacock has not been made and as a result, claims against these three defendants should be
dismissed without prejudice.
DATED this

lb day of Fsbsuary, 2004.
BY THE COURT

Leslie A. Lewis
Third District Judge

(9jl^t^^h^^

^^^^--^

4fwv
C C :

\*>
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby cei tify tl lat 01 1 tl lis _ 6 | _ day of March, 2004, a true and correct copy of" the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCI AJSIONS OF I AW was served via hand delivery to
tl ie followii lg:
Todd D. Weiler
Parry Anderson & Gardiner
1270 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt I akeCity, I Jtah 84" 11

o
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IMAGED
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
Erik A. Olson (8479)
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

FILED IliSTBECT COURT
Third Judicial District

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Facsimile: (801) 415-3500

MAR 2 5 20M
SALT LAKE COUNTY

ay. ...rpX-Yv"1^
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

-fWviockd
ARIS VISION INSTITUTE, INC., a
California corporation, d/b/a ARIS VISION,
INC.,

JUDGMENT AGAINST WASATCH
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.,
AND JDJ PROPERTIES, INC.

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020900624
vs.

Judge Leslie A. Lewis

WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
INC., a Utah corporation, JDJ PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation, DAVID SKALKA,
an individual, BRIAN SKALKA, an
individual, and DENNIS PEACOCK, an
individual,
020900624

JD13772312
WASATCH PROPERTY MANAGEMEN

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court at a bench trial, which concluded on October
16, 2003. Plaintiff Aris Vision Institute, Inc., ("Aris") was represented at trial by R. Stephen
Marshall, and defendants Wasatch Property Management, Inc., ("Wasatch") and JDJ Properties,
Inc., ("JDJ") were represented by Todd D. Weiler. Having carefully reviewed all of the evidence

STC5

received at trial, along with the written and oral arguments of counsel, and based on the Court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Judgment is ENTERED against Wasatch and JDJ, jointly and severally,

for treble damages in the total amount of $553,506.51 (three times $187,687.63 less the rent due
in the amount of $9,556.38), attorney fees in the amount of $_
the amount of $

, and costs in

a total judgment in the amount of $ (pDjQ H ip 3

'3 p

together with post-judgment interest at the legal rate;
2.

In addition to the foregoing judgment, judgment is also ENTERED against

JDJ for the amount of $13,393.89 (security deposit), together with post-judgment interest at the
legal rate;
3.

JDJ's counterclaim against Aris is DISMISSED with prejudice and on the

4.

JDJ and Wasatch's motion to dismiss is DENIED; and

5.

Aris's claims against defendants David Skalka, Brian Skalka, and Dennis

merits;

Peacock are DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to serve these defendants with process.
DATED this

//fit

-I>/1\OJ

/sLday of February, 2004.
BY/THE COURT

Leslie A. Lewis
Third District Judge

3 -/*
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JUDGMENT DEBTOR INFORMATION (UTAH CODE ANN. $ 78-22-1.5)
1.

Judgment debtor Wasatch Property Management, Inc., ("Wasatch") was

served through its Vice President and General Counsel, John A. Dahlstrom, Jr., at 299 South
Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
2.

Judgment debtor JDJ Properties, Inc., ("JDJ") was also served through Mr.

Dahlstrom at 299 South Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.
3.

The last known business addresses of Wasatch and JDJ are 299 South

Main Street, Suite 2400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and 399 North Main, Suite 200, Logan,
Utah 84321.
4.

The name and address of the judgment creditor is Aris Vision Institute,

Inc., dba Aris Vision, Inc., 2730 Armacoast Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90064.
5.

The tax ID numbers of Wasatch and JDJ are unknown.

6.

The judgment has not been stayed.

7.

Any further information required by section 78-22-1.5 but not provided in

this statement is unknown and unavailable to the judgment creditor.

3
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78-35a-304

CHAPTER 36
FORCIBLE ENTRY A N D DETAINER
Section
78-36-1.
78-36-2.
78-36-3.
78-36-4.
78-36-5.
78-36-6.
78-36-7.
78-36-8.
78-36-8.5.
78-36-9.
78-36-10.
78-36-10.5

"Forcible entry" defined.
"Forcible detainer" defined.
Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than
life.
Right of tenant of agricultural lands to hold
over.
Remedies available to tenant against undertenant.
Definitions — Notice to quit — How served.
Necessary parties defendant.
Allegations permitted in complaint — Time for
appearance — Service of summons.
Possession bond of plaintiff—Alternative remedies.
Proof required of plaintiff— Defense.
Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent —
Immediate enforcement — Treble damages.
Order of restitution — Service — Enforcement
— Disposition of personal property — Hearing.

78-36-1
Section
78-36-11.
78-36-12.
78-36-12.3,
78-36-12.6.

JUDICIAL CODE
Time for appeal
Exclusion of tenant without judicial process
prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
Definitions.
Abandoned premises — Retaking and
rerenting by owner — Liability of tenant —
Personal property of tenant left on premises.

78-36-1. " F o r c i b l e e n t r y " defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either:
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other^parts of a
house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by any kind
of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into
any real property; or,
(2) after entering peaceably upon real property, t u r n s
out by force, threats or menacing conduct the party in
actual possession.
1953
78-36-2. " F o r c i b l e d e t a i n e r " defined.
Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who either:
(1) by force, or by menaces and threats of violence,
unlawfully holds and keeps the possession of any real
property, w h e t h e r the same was acquired peaceably or
otherwise; or,
(2) in t h e nighttime, or during the absence of the
occupants of a n y real property, unlawfully enters thereon,
and, after d e m a n d made for the surrender thereof, refuses
for the period of three days to surrender the same to such
former occupant. The occupant of real property within the
meaning of this subdivision is one who within five days
preceding such unlawful entry was in the peaceable and
undisturbed possession of such lands.
1953
78-36-3.

U n l a w f u l d e t a i n e r by t e n a n t for t e r m less
t h a n life.
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is
guilty of an unlawful detainer:
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, of t h e property or any part of it, after the
expiration of t h e specified term or period for which it is let
to him, which specified term or period, whether established by express or implied contract, or whether written
or parol, shall be terminated without notice at the expiration of the specified term or period;
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite
time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved:
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by
subtenant after the end of any month or period, in
cases w h e r e the owner, his designated agent, or any
successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior
to the end of that month or period, has served notice
requiring h i m to quit the premises at the expiration
of t h a t m o n t h or period; or
(ii) in cases of tenancies at will, where he remains
in possession of the premises after the expiration of a
notice of not less than five days;
(c) when h e continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, after default in the payment of any rent and
after a notice in writing requiring in the alternative the
payment of t h e rent or the surrender of the detained
premises, has remained uncomplied with for a period of
three days after service, which notice may be served at
any time after the rent becomes due;
(d) when h e assigns or sublets the leased premises
contrary to t h e covenants of the lease, or commits or
permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up or
carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or
when he suffers, permits, or maintains on or about the
n r p m l o o c o n * / %-iiiJor.««~ - — 1 - *'
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Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after service
upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by
subtenant, after a neglect or failure to perform any
condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under
which the property is held, other thari those previously
mentioned, and after notice in writing requiring in the
alternative the performance of the conditions or covenant
or the surrender of the property, served upon him and
upon any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises
remains uncomplied with for three days after service.
Within three days after the service of the notice, the
tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the pre-,
mises, any mortgagee of the term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the condition or
covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture,
except t h a t if t h e covenants and conditions of the lease
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be performed,
then no notice need be given.
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile
home is determined under Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home
P a r k Residency Act.
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-363(l)(d) are not applicable to nuisance actions provided in
Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16 only.
1992
78-36-4.

R i g h t of t e n a n t of a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d s to h o l d
over.
In all cases of tenancy upon agricultural lands, where the
tenant has held over and retained possession for more than 60
days after the expiration of his term without any demand of
possession or notice to quit by the owner, his designated agent,
or his successor in estate, he shall be deemed to be held by
permission of the owner, his designated agent, or his successor
in estate, and shall be entitled to hold under the terms of the
lease for another full year, and shall not be guilty of an
unlawful detainer during t h a t year; and the holding over for
the 60-day period shall be taken and construed as a consent on
the part of the tenant to hold for another year.
1981
78-36-5.

R e m e d i e s a v a i l a b l e to t e n a n t a g a i n s t u n d e r tenant.
A tenant may take proceedings similar to those prescribed
in this chapter to obtain possession of the premises let to a n
undertenant in case of his unlawful detention of the premises
underlet to him.
1953
78-36-6. D e f i n i t i o n s — N o t i c e to q u i t — H o w s e r v e d .
(1) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Commercial tenant" means any tenant who may be
a body politic and corporate, partnership, association, or
company.
(b) "Tenant" means any natural person and any individual other t h a n a commercial tenant.
(2) The notices required by Title 78, Chapter 36, Forcible
Entry and Detainer, may be served:
(a) by delivering a copy to the tenant personally or, if
the tenant is a commercial tenant, by delivering a copy to
the commercial tenant's usual place of business by leaving
a copy of the notice with a person of suitable age and
discretion;
(b) by sending a copy through registered or certified
mail addressed to the tenant at his place of residence or,
if the tenant is a commercial tenant, by sending a copy
through registered or certified mail addressed to the
commercial tenant's usual place of business;
(c) if he is absent from his place of residence or from his
usual place of business, bv leaving » rnmr wH-Vi o ™>-~ r

JUDICIAL CODE
copy to the tenant at t h e address of his place of residence
or place of business;
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be
found at the place of residence, then by affixing a copy in
a conspicuous place on the leased property; or
(e) if an order of abatement by eviction of the nuisance
is issued by the court as provided in Section 78-38-11,
when issued, the parties present shall be on notice that
the abatement by eviction order is issued and immediately effective or as to any absent party, notice shall be
given as provided in Subsections (2)(a) through (e).
3) Service upon a subtenant may be made in the same
nner as provided in Subsection (2).
1997
•36-7. N e c e s s a r y p a r t i e s d e f e n d a n t ,
1) No person other than the tenant of the premises, and
Dtenant if there is one in the actual occupation of the
jmises when the action is commenced, shall be made a party
Pendant in the proceeding, except as provided in Section
-38-13, nor shall any proceeding abate, nor the plaintiff be
nsuited, for the nonjoinder of any person who might have
en made a party defendant; but when it appears that any of
e parties served with process or appearing in the proceedgs are guilty, judgment shall be rendered against those
rties.
(2) If a person has become subtenant of the premises in
ntroversy after the service of any notice as provided in this
tapter, the fact t h a t such notice was not served on the
ibtenant is not a defense to t h e action. All persons who enter
ider the tenant after the commencement of the action shall
i bound by the judgment the same as if they had been made
irties to the action.
(3) A landlord, owner, or designated agent is a necessary
arty defendant only in an abatement by eviction action for an
alawful drug house as provided in Section 78-38-13.
1992
8-36-8. A l l e g a t i o n s p e r m i t t e d i n c o m p l a i n t — T i m e
for a p p e a r a n c e — S e r v i c e of s u m m o n s .
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth
tie facts on which he seeks to recover, may set forth any
ircumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may have
.ccompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful
letainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation for the
•ccupation of^the premises, or both. If the unlawful detainer
harged is after default in the payment of rent, the complaint
shall state the amount of rent due. The court shall indorse on
h e summons the number of days within which the defendant
.s required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be
less t h a n three or more than 20 days from the date of service.
The court may authorize service by publication or mail for
cause shown. Service by publication is complete one week
after publication. Service by mail is complete three days after
mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to
the time of service as ordered, and shall be served as in other
1987
cases.
78-36-8.5.

78-36-10

sion bond. This notice shall be served in the same manner as
service of summons and shall inform the defendant of all of the
alternative remedies and procedures under Subsection (2).
(2) The following are alternative remedies and procedures
applicable to an action if the plaintiff files a possession bond
under Subsection (1):
'(a) With respect to an unlawful detainer action based
solely upon nonpayment of r e n t or utilities, the existing
contract shall remain in force and the complaint shall be
dismissed if the defendant, within three days of the
service of the notice of the possession bond, pays accrued
rent, utility charges, any late fee, and other costs, including attorney's fees, as provided in the rental agreement,
(b) The defendant may remain in possession if he
executes and files a counter bond in the form of a
corporate bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property
bond executed by two persons who own real property in
the state and who are not parties to the action. The form
of the bond is at the defendant's option. The bond shall be
payable to the clerk of the court. The defendant shall file
the bond prior to the expiration of three days from the
date he is served with notice of the filing of plaintiffs
possession bond. The court shall approve the bond in an
amount t h a t is the probable amount of costs of suit and
actual damages that may result to the plaintiff if the
defendant has improperly withheld possession. The court
shall consider prepaid rent to t h e owner as a portion of the
defendant's total bond.
(c) The defendant, upon demand, shall be granted a
hearing to be held prior to the expiration of three days
from the date the defendant is served with notice of the
filing of plaintiff's possession bond.
(3) If the defendant does not elect and comply with a
remedy under Subsection (2) within the required time, the
plaintiff, upon ex parte motion, shall be granted an order of
restitution. The constable of the precinct or the sheriff of the
county where the property is situated shall return possession
of the property to the plaintiff promptly.
(4) If the defendant demands a hearing under Subsection
(2)(c), and if the court rules after t h e hearing that the plaintiff
is entitled to possession of the property, the constable or
sheriff shall promptly return possession of the property to the
plaintiff. If a t the hearing the court allows the defendant to
remain in possession and further issues remain to be adjudicated between the parties, the court shall require the defendant to post a bond as required in Subsection (2)(b). If at the
hearing the court rules that all issues between the parties can
be adjudicated without further court proceedings, the court
shall, upon adjudicating those issues, enter judgment on the
merits.
1987

P o s s e s s i o n b o n d of plaintiff — A l t e r n a t i v e
remedies.
(1) At any time between the filing of his complaint and the
entry of final judgment, the plaintiff may execute and file a
possession bond. The bond may be in the form of a corporate
bond, a cash bond, certified funds, or a property bond executed
by two persons who own real property in the state and who are
not parties to the action. The court shall approve the bond in
an amount t h a t is the probable amount of costs of suit and
damages which may result to the defendant if the suit has
been improperly instituted. The bond shall be payable to the
clerk of the court for the benefit of the defendant for all costs
and damages actually adjudged against the plaintiff. The
plaintiff shall notify the defendant that he has filed a posses-

78-36-9. P r o o f r e q u i r e d of p l a i n t i f f — Defense.
On the trial of any proceeding for any forcible entry or
forcible detainer the plaintiff shall only be required to show, in
addition to the forcible entry or forcible detainer complained
of, that he was peaceably in the actual possession at the time
of the forcible entry, or was entitled to the possession at the
time of the forcible detainer. The defendant may show in his
defense that he or his ancestors, or those whose interest in
such premises he claims, had been in the quiet possession
thereof for the space of one whole year continuously next
before the commencement of t h e proceedings, and that his
interest therein is not then ended or determined; and such
showing is a bar to the proceedings.
1953
78-36-10. J u d g m e n t for r e s t i t u t i o n , d a m a g e s , a n d r e n t
— I m m e d i a t e e n f o r c e m e n t — Treble d a m a g e s .
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon
default A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall
include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided

78-36-10,5
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in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure to perform any condition or
covenant of t h e lease or agreement under which the property
is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement.
(2) The j u r y or the court, if the proceeding is tried without
a jury or upon t h e defendant's default, shall also assess the
damages r e s u l t i n g to the plaintiff from any of the following:
(a) forcible entry;
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer;
(c) w a s t e of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if w a s t e is alleged in the complaint and proved a t
trial;
(d) t h e amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful
detainer is after default in the payment of rent; and
(e) t h e abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78-38-16.
(3) The j u d g m e n t shall be entered against the defendant for
the rent, for t h r e e times the amount of the damages assessed
under Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for reasonable
attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement.
(4) If t h e proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in
the payment of t h e rent, execution upon the judgment shall be
issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all
cases, the j u d g m e n t may be issued and enforced immediately.
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78-36-10.5. O r d e r of r e s t i t u t i o n — S e r v i c e — E n f o r c e m e n t — D i s p o s i t i o n of p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y —
Hearing.
(1) Each order of restitution shall:
(a) direct t h e defendant to vacate the premises, remove
his personal property, and restore possession of the premises to t h e plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by a sheriff or
constable;
(b) advise the defendant of the time limit set by the
court for t h e defendant to vacate the premises, which
shall be t h r e e business days following service of the order,
unless t h e court determines that a longer or shorter
period is appropriate under the circumstances; and
(c) advise the defendant of the defendant's right to a
hearing to contest the manner of its enforcement.
(2) (a) A copy of the order of restitution and a form for the
defendant to request a hearing as listed on the form shall
be served in accordance with Section 78-36-6 by a person
authorized to serve process pursuant to Subsection 7812a-2(l). If personal service is impossible or impracticable, service may be made by:
(i) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the
defendant's last-known address and posting a copy of
the.order and the form a t a conspicuous place on the
premises; or
(ii) mailing a copy of the order and the form to the
commercial tenant defendant's last-known place of
business and posting a copy of the order and the form
at a conspicuous place on the business premises.
(b) A r e q u e s t for hearing by the defendant may not stay
enforcement of the restitution order unless:
(i) t h e defendant furnishes a corporate bond, cash
bond, certified funds, or a property bond to the clerk
of t h e court in an amount approved by the court
according to the formula set forth in Subsection
78-36-8.5(2)(b); and
(ii) t h e court orders that the restitution order be
stayed.
(c) The d a t e of service, the name, title, signature, and
telephone number of the person serving the order and the
form shall be legibly endorsed on the cor>v of the order and
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(d) Within ten days of service, the person serving the
order and the form shall file proof of service in accordance
with Rule 4(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) If the defendant fails to comply with the order
within the time prescribed by the court, a sheriff or
constable a t the plaintiff's direction may enter the premises by force using the least destructive means possible
to remove the defendant.
(b) Any personal property of the defendant may be
removed from the premises by the sheriff or constable and
transported to a suitable location for safe storage. The
sheriff or constable may delegate responsibility for storage to t h e plaintiff, who shall store the personal property
in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner.
(c) The personal property removed and stored shall be
inventoried by the sheriff or constable or the plaintiff who
shall keep the original inventory and personally deliver or
mail t h e defendant a copy of the inventory immediately
after t h e personal property is removed.
(4) (a) After demand made by the defendant within 30 days
of removal of personal property from the premises, the
sheriff or constable or the plaintiff shall promptly return
all of t h e defendant's personal property upon payment of
the reasonable costs incurred for its removal and storage.
(b) The person storing the personal property may sell
the property remaining in storage at a public sale if:
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or
demand return of the personal property within 30
days of its removal from the premises; or
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs
incurred for the removal and storage of the personal
property.
(c) In advance of the sale, the person storing the
personal property shall mail to the defendant's lastknown address a written notice of the time and place of
the sale.
(d) If the defendant is present a t the sale, he may
specify the order in which, the personal property shall be
sold, and only so much personal property shall be sold as
to satisfy the costs of removal, storage, advertising, and
conducting the sale. The remainder of the personal property, if any, shall be released to the defendant. If the
defendant is not present at the sale, the proceeds, after
deduction of the costs of removal, storage, advertising,
and conducting the sale shall be paid to the plaintiff up to
the amount of any judgment the plaintiff obtained against
the defendant. Any surplus shall be paid to the defendant,
if the defendant's whereabouts are known. If the defendant's whereabouts are not known, any surplus shall be
disposed of in accordance with Title 67, Chapter 4a,
Unclaimed Property Act,
(e) The plaintiff may donate the property to charity if:
(i) the defendant does not request a hearing or
demand return of the personal property within 30
days of its removal from the premises; or
(ii) the defendant fails to pay the reasonable costs
incurred for the removal and storage of the personal
property; and
(iii) donation is a commercially reasonable alternative.
(f) If the property belonging to a person who is not a
defendant is removed and stored in accordance with this
section, t h a t person may claim the property by delivering
a written demand for its release to the sheriff or constable
or the plaintiff. If the claimant provides proper identification and evidence of ownership, the sheriff or constable
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(5) In the event of a dispute concerning the manner of
forcement of the restitution order, the defendant or any
rson claiming to own stored personal property may file a
quest for a hearing The court shall set the matter for
»armg within ten days from the filing of the request, or as
on thereafter as practicable, and shall mail notice of the
»aring to the parties
(6) The Judicial Council shall draft the forms necessary to
lplement this section
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3-36-11. T i m e for a p p e a l .
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), either party may,
ithm ten days, appeal from the judgment rendered
(2) In a nuisance action under Sections 78 38 9 through
3 38-16, any party may appeal from the judgment rendered
ithin three days
1992
8-36-12.

E x c l u s i o n of t e n a n t w i t h o u t j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s
prohibited — Abandoned premises excepted.
It is unlawful for an owner to willfully exclude a tenant from
tie tenant's premises in any manner except by judicial proess, provided, an owner or his agent shall not be prevented
rom removing the contents of the leased premises under
>ubsection 78-36-12 6(2) and retaking the premises and atempting to rent them at a fair rental value when the t e n a n t
las abandoned the premises
1981
r8-36-12.3. Definitions.
(1) "Willful exclusion" means preventing the tenant from
entering into the premises with intent to deprive the tenant of
>uch entry
(2) "Owner" means the actual owner of the premises and
shall also have the same meaning as landlord under common
[aw and the statutes of this state
(3) "Abandonment" is presumed in either of the following
situations
(a) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she
will be absent from the premises, and the tenant fails to
pay rent within 15 days after the due date, and there is no
reasonable evidence other than the presence of the tenant's personal property that the tenant is occupying the
premises, or
(b) The tenant has not notified the owner that he or she
will be absent from the premises, and the tenant fails to
pay rent when due and the tenant's personal property has
been removed from the dwelling unit and there is no
reasonable evidence t h a t the tenant is occupying the
premises
1981
78-36-12.6. A b a n d o n e d p r e m i s e s — R e t a k i n g a n d
r e r e n t i n g by o w n e r — Liability of t e n a n t —
P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y of t e n a n t left o n p r e m i s e s .
(1) In the event of abandonment, the owner may retake the
premises and attempt to rent them at a fair rental value and
the tenant who abandoned the premises shall be liable
(a) for the entire rent due for the remainder of the
term, or
(b) for rent accrued during the period necessary to
rerent the premises at a fair rental value, plus the
difference between the fair rental value and the rent
agreed to m the prior rental agreement, plus a reasonable
commission for the renting of the premises and the costs,
if any, necessary to restore the rental unit to its condition
when rented by the tenant less normal wear and tear
This subsection applies, if less than Subsection (a), notwithstanding that the owner did not rerent the premises
(2) (a) If the tenant has abandoned the premises and has
left personal property on the premises, the owner is
entitled to remove the property from the dwelling, store it
for the tenant, and recover actual moving and storage
costs from the tenant

78-37-1.5

(b) (1) The owner shall make reasonable efforts to
notify the tenant of the location of the personal
property
(u) If the property has been in storage for over 30
days and the tenant has made no reasonable effort to
recover it, the owner may
(A) sell the property and apply the proceeds
toward any amount the tenant owes, or
(B) donate the property to chanty if the donation is a commercially reasonable alternative
(c) Any money left over from the sale of the property
shall be handled as specified in Title 67, Chapter 4a, Part
2, Standards for Determining When Property is Abandoned or Unclaimed
(d) Nothing contained in. this act shall be in derogation
of or alter the owner's rights under Title 38, Chapter 3,
Lessors' Liens
1997

